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ALUMNI NOTES.
W. W. Johnson, '01, has successfully
passed the Lackawanna county examination.
Marlin Wolf, '99, was recently admitted
to practice in Northumberland county.
Frank Strause, '98, has been appointed
deputy prothonotary of Northumberland
county.

George Points, '96, besides practicing
law, is co-operating in the publication of
one of the newspapers of Bedford.
The Catholic Light, published and edited by Win. F. Shean, 196, is constantly increasing in the excellence of its materials,
and the satisfactoriness of its form.. It is
destined to be a great power in the diocese
of which Scranton is the see. Mr. Shean
has not given up the law business.
Irving, '98, of New York, spent several
days in Carlisle, during February. He
looks well and prosperous.

Wm. T. Stauffer, '01, recently passed a
creditable examination at NewportNews,
Virginia, and has been admitted to practice in the courts of that state.
SCHOOL NOTES.
It may be of interest to many of the
students, and we therefore call attention to
a tabulated statistical table, containing
one year's statistics from each of the 67
counties in Pennsylvania in re registration and admission to the Bar. This table
was prepared by the secretary of the committee appointed by the Pennsylvania
Bar Association for the purpose of menmorializing the Supreme Court in regard to
the appointment of a State Board of Examiners. It appears in "The Legal Intelligencer," of January 17. It shows the
total number of applications foradmission
in each county, the number of registrations, the number of student candidates
for admission, attorneys from other jurisdictions, and the ratio of admissions, exclusive of comity, to each 20,000 of population.
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An interesting article on "The Ripper
Cases" appears in the February number of
the "larvardLaw 1?evicw."
The students of the school, as well as the
Alumni, will be pleased to learn that the
sale of Mr. Vale's book, "Elementary Principles of Pennsylvania Law," has been so
great as to necessitate a second issue
within the next month.
During the month, the already splendid
library of the school has been increased by
the addition of a complete set of that excellent publication- "Lawyers Reports
Annotated." A complete set of Iowa reports has also been added.
The Pennsylvania Archives, thirty volumes, have been placed in the library
through the kindness of President Reed,
State Librarian.
The law school was largely represented
at the Lincoln Day banquet. The following members participated in the programFaculty, Prof. F. C. Woodward; Class of
1902, J. 0. Adamson; Class of 1903, A. T.
Walsh; Class of 1904, J. E. Fleitz.
We are deeply pained to note the death
of the father of Joseph and Frank Rhodes,
of the Senior Class, the announcement of
which comes to us as we go to press. The
sympathy and condolence of the entire
school Is with our two fellow-students in
their bereavement.
The serious illness of Leroy Delaney,
enforcing his return to his home, is a
matter of regret to the students. *Wewill
be pleased to hear of his early recovery.
The retirement of Wanner, '03, from the
school on account of continued ill health,
is a cause of sincere regret to his fellowstudents and the faculty.
DEATH OF S. H. KOSTENBAUDER.
We are deeply pained to announce the
death of Samuel H. Kostenbaudex, a member of the class of 1902. About a yearago,
the germs oftuberculosis developed. During the summer, the progress of the
disease was rapid and in the hope of staying its ravages he went to the sanatarium
at Saranac Lake, N. Y., about three
months ago, but without avail. He died

February 11, aged twenty-one years. At
a meeting of the class of which he was a
member, the following resolutions were
unanimously adopted.
Whereas, Providence, in its infinite
wisdom, has removed from our midst our
former classmate, S. H. Kostenbauder.
Beit:
Resolved-That by his death the class
of 1902 has suffered the loss of one who
was a loyal, earnest member, a kind
friend, and a genial companion.
Resolved-That we especially mourn the
loss of one whose early manhood gave
promise of so much usefulness. Be it
further:
Resolved-That we extend to the family
of our late classmate our deepest and most
sincere sympathy. Also, be it:
R-esolved-That a copy of these resolutions be sent to the bereaved family, that
they be spread upon the minutes and that
said resolutions be inserted in The Forum.
PHILIP T. LONERGAN,

ROBERT H. MOON,
WiLLIAm T. OsBORNE,
Committee.
HISTORICAL SOCIETY.
At the last annual meeting of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, the Committee on Legal Biography outlined the
following plan for the preservation of the
legal history of the state. "As the history
of the higher courts is largely provided
for, this committee especially aims at preserving the history of the judicial dis-.
tricts, although not limited to that alone.
So far this has been best done by addresses
delivered before the bar of the district,
either on the history of the bench or the
history of the leaders of the bar itself.
This principle should be the basis of future
operations of this committee, as producing,
in the end, the most authoritative, sympathetic, proportioned history of the judiciary and bar of the state possible."
To the end that our law school might
co-operate with the Historical Committee
of the State Bar Association, a mass meeting of the students was called, when it was
unanimously agreed that we organize a
Students' Legal Historical Society. An
organization was effected and the following officers elected:

THE FORUM
President-J. P. McKeehan.
Vice President-A. T. Walsh.
Secretary-H. H. Hillyer.
Treasurer-F. J. Cannon.
Interesting and instructive featureshave
already been arranged. Hon. E. W.
Biddle has kindly consented to deliver an
address on "Judge Reed," the founder of
the Dickinson School of Law. Following
Judge Biddle, an address will be given on
"A Glimpse at the Past History of the
Law," suggestive to the young lawyer of
to-day. This address will be delivered
by the Hon. William Penn Lloyd, Treasurer of the State Bar Association. Both
of these gentlemen are well known as
painstaking investigators, and we are indeed most fortunate to secure their services at this, the outset of our Legal Historical Society.
THE ALLISON'S CONGRESS.
The interest in the Allison Congress
continues unabated, and at th6 request of
the Society, the Executive Committee has
consented to permit the Congress to remain in session until some time in March.
The excellent parliamentary training, the
opportunities to debate questions that are
at present before the National House of
Representatives, and the earnestness with
which the Allison's sessions are being
conducted, have brought to the members'
minds the fact that there is as much profit
as pleasure to be derived from these
sessions. As a result of these realizations,
every session is so largely attended that
the hall is inadequate to accommodate the
crowd. Not only members of the Allison
Society attend, but also members of the
Dickinson Society, and students of the
other departments of the college. The debates on the various bills have been
thorough, and at times rather bitter,
political principles occasionally cropping
out.
At the organization of the House,
Walsh was elected Speaker, and Donahoe,
Clerk. The Speaker announced that the
order of business during the sessions
would be as follows:
Unfinished business; reports of standing committees; reports of special committees; bills on first reading; bills on
second reading; bills on third reading; introduction of bills; new business.

The Speaker stated that he considered
the above order of business the most practicable for all purposes.
After the appointments of the House
officers, and the Standing Committees,
the new'order of business was taken up.
The President's message was read and
ordered placed on the record. Tlme following bills were introduced: by Mr. Dever,
bill providing for the construction of a
submarine cable between San Francisco,
Cal., and Manilla, P. I.; by Mr. Core, providing for the purchase of the Panama
Canal; by Mr. Adanison, bill providing
for the increasing of the Army and Navy;
by Mr. Wilcox, bill providing for the exclusion of the Chinese.
Some of the above bills passed third
reading. They were debated in an interesting manner. Messrs. Core, Adamson,
Lonergan, Crary, White, Benjamin,
Flynn, Wilcox, Mays, Dever, Schnee,
participating.
The following officers have been elected.
President-Core.
Vice President-Mays.
Secretary-Benjamin.
Treasurer-Wilcox.
Executive Committee-Schnee, Fleitz,
and Hillyer.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
Interest in society work seems to he on
the increase, if the well attended meetings
of Dickinson, and the lengthiy programs
there rendered, are an indication. The
meetings of the month past are among
the best of the present year.
On Friday evening, January 17, among
the features of the program was a referred
question as to the necessity of a college
education to the study of law, discussed
by Hamblen; extemporaneous talks by
Gerber, Hickernell and Williamson. The
debate, Resolved: "That the United States
should own and control the telegraph lines
throughout the country," was debated on
the affirmative by Fox and Yeagley, on
the negative by Keelor and Chapman.
Then followed a general debate, which
was well discussed.
The meeting of January 24th was essentially a humorous meeting; humorous
quotations in answer to roll call, a humorous story by Lenard, and a referred question, by Fox, "Can a man be convicted of
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horse stealing when he hasstolen a mule?"
-were
well enjoyed. Another feature
was the excellent violin music discoursed
by Mr. Brundage. Mr. Brundage is an
artist of no mean ability. The debate,
Resolved: "That a city boy is greener In the
country than the country boy is in the
city," was funny and laughable. Messrs.
Moorehouse and Keelor assumed the affirmative, Messrs. Matthews and Cook the
negative.
Blackstone definitions proved quite a
severe test when they were required in
answer to roll call of the meeting of February 7. Mr. Fox ably discussed the
question: "Is the study of Blackstone
really as advantageous as it is supposed to
be, or would it be better to study more
modern writers." Schanz and Peightel
debated the question as to whether the condition of the free negro, as it is, is an improvement over his condition as a slave.
The question is one that is well mooted at
present, and both speakers advanced
weighty arguments to support their cause.
W. P. Bishop read an interesting and
instructive paper on the "Law of Assault
and Battery," in the meeting of February
7. Papers bf this nature, in the line of
our work, have many benefits, both to the
society and the member preparing it.
May we have more!
In closing, toomuch cannot be said upon
the benefits that a literary society affords
a law student. A lawyer is essentially a
talker, and will count for naught in the
professionAl world if he cannot frame his
ideaq and clothe them in appropriate language. Of what benefit is stored up legal
knowledge that he cannot impart or express to others? Clients will shun the
man that blunders in his speech before a
jury-they will form a low estimate of his
ability and knowledge if he fails to clearly
expound to them the law upon the question asked. Then let every member of
Dickinson make a special effort to attend
every meeting, and take their parts as
assigned on the program.
DELTA CHI.
Through the efforts of the Dickinson
chapter, a charter has been granted for a
chapter of Delta Chi at the University of
West Virginia. During the stay of
Messrs. Boryer and Osborne at Morgan-

town they planted the seed and It has
taken root. Indications are that the new
chapter will become a very prosperous
one.
The boys enjoyed a sleighing party to
Mt. Holly during the month.
The following is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases:
Plaintiff

Defendant

No. 75. Bradshaw,
Flynn,
Oldt.
Spencer.
Drumheller, J.
No. 76. Moon,
Boryer,
Drumheller.
Longbottom.
Osborne, J.
No. 77. Rothermel,
Hillyer,
Kline.
Hindman.
Vastine, J.
No. 78. James,
Brundage,
Berkhouse.
Cook.
Watson, J.
No. 79. Bouton,
Claycomb,
Brennan.
Schanz.
Bishop, J.
No. 80. Brooks,
Sterrett,
Minnich.
Rhodes, F.
Turner, J.
No. 81. Thorne,
Elmes,
Dever.
Keelor.
Wanner, J.
No. 82. Cooper,
Crary,
Core.
Myers.
Fox, J.
No. 83. Wright,
Yeagley,
Phillips.
Peightel.
Walsh, J.
No. 84. Houser,
Lonergan,
McKeehan.
Points.
Elmes, J.
No. 85. Moon,
MaeConuell,
Davis.
Laubenstein.
Boryer, J.
No. 86. Hubler,
Lloyd,
Jacobs, J. W.
Houck.
Williamson, J.
No. 87. Matthews,
Dively,
Prickett.
Yocum.
Watson, J.
No. 88. Bishop,
Mays,
Sherbine.
3 ones.
Gross, J.
No. 89. Cannon,
Ebbert,
Kline.
Schnee.
Gerber, J.
No. 90. Rhodes, J.
Gerber,
Hickernell.
Donahoe.
Houser, J.
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DR. REED'S RE-APPOINTMENT.
The re-appointment as State Librarian,
of George E. Reed. LL. D., President of
the Law School, is the source of great
satisfaction to the students of the School.
During his first term, many books have
been added to the library, and its contents
have been made accessible to the public
by the adoption of a complete and well
arranged method of cataloguing. The
library has never been so useful to the
public as now. It is needless to say that
the officers are exceedingly polite and attentive to the wishes of patrons, and every
assistance is rendered to put at the service
of the visitor any book that is required.
So much could not be said of some former
administrations. The intimate relations
between Dr. Reed and the leading personages of the State have made the College
better known than it ever was before, and
cannot fail to increase its patronage and
influence.

No other evidence of payment was produced. It was shown that Jacob had had
opportunities to gain possession ofthe bond
without the consent or knowledge of John.
The court gave binding instructions for
the defendant. Motion for a new trial.
BRADS HAW and BRENNAN for the plaintiff.
Where the maker of a note has access to
the papers of the payee. the possession of
the paper by the maker is not in itself a
proof of payment. Grey v. Grey, 47 N.Y.
564; Wharton, Evidence, Vol. II, p. 1362;
Greenleaf Is Evidence, p. 136; Bowman v.
Teal, 23 Wend. 306.

THE LAW OF WITNESSES.
What may be considered as an installment of a larger work on the Law of Evidence, has been published during the present month, under the title of Law of
Witnesses in Pennsylvania. This book, by
Dean Trickett, deals with the subject of
the competency of witnesses under recent
legislation, especially the acts of 1887 and
1891. It is dedicated to the Alumni of
the Dickinson School of Law. T. &. J.
W. Johnson & Co., of Philadelphia, are
the publishers.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

BRUNDAGE and COOPER for the defend-

ant.
The presumption is that the bond was
satisfied, and that it was being held by the
maker as his receipt. The presumption is
that the holder of commercial paper is a
bonafide holder. Real Estate Co. v. Russel, 148 Pa. 496; Peters' Appeal, 106 Pa.
340; Porter v. Nelson's Exrs., 121 Pa. 628;
Hastings v. Wagner, 7 W. & S.215.
The court was justified in giving binding instructions. Ruby v. Cell, 85 Pa. 80.

In this case a bond was giveD by the defendant to his father, now deceased. Prior
to his death possession of the same was
secured by him, though it was not at the
time due. The administrator of the father
brings this action to recover upon the lost
bond. Evidence was offered by defendant
as to his possession of it before the father's
decease, and the instrument itself was produced. Testimony was also given by the
plaintiff to show that there had been opportunities of stealing the bond. Under
these facts, the court gave binding instrucMOOT COURT.
tions for the defendant, and this motion
for a new trial is the result.
KRAUSE, ADM'R. vs. KRAUSE.
It will be noticed that the instrument
produced is admitted to be the one deBond-Possessionby debtor-Presumption clared upon as lost, so that the ruling made
of payment.
in Helzer v. Helzer, 187 Pa. 243, is not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The bond is in the possession of the deJacob Krause executed a bond for $1,000
fendant, but it is insisted that this does
to John Krause, his father, at whose death
not raise a presumption of payment. The
rule contended for is applicable to comWilliam, a son, became administrator.
William Krause brought assumpsit on the mercial paper, as determined in Eckert v.
bond, declaring on it as Iost since he did not Cameron, 43 Pa. 120, and other Pennsylvania cases. But we do not think the
find it. Jacob Krause produced the bond,
and proved that he had had possession of same rule applies in the case of bonds or
it since at least three months before John judgments. This distinction is drawn by
Krause's death. The bond did not become
Greenleaf in his work on Evidence, Vol.
due until four weeks after John's death. II, 527: "Where, in the ordinary course
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of dealing, a security when paid is given
up to the party who pays it, the possession
of the security by the debtor after the date
of payment is prima facie evidence that he
has paid it. But the mere production of
a bill of exchange from the custody of the
acceptor affords no presumption that he
has paid it, without proof that it was once
in circulation after he accepted it." That
it would be prima facie evidence is supported by many authorities cited by Abbott in his Trial Brief, p. 526, and his work
on Trial Evidence, p. 1027. But even if
not presumptive evidence of payment, the
same conclusion would be reached in this
case. The burden of proving ownership is
on him who asserts it. Huston v. Harrison, 168 Pa. 136. To entitle the plaintiff
to recover here it would be necessary to
presume that his possession of the bond
was unlawful. Evidence was offered to
show that the opportunity to take it
existed, but that is all. 'While fraud may
be proved like any other fact by evidence
tending to establish its existence, yet it is
a serious accusation, and is not to be lightly
infefred. It is not enough to charge fraud,
and prove in support thereof slight circumstances of suspicion only. To be of any
avail, it must be clearly proved." Mead
v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220.
And it is error to submit to the jury the
question whether there has been fraud or
collusion if there be no evidence of such
fraud or collusion. Morton v. Weaver, 99
Pa. 47.
We are supported in the conclusion
reached by a case involving a similar question, in which the same determination was
made and approved. Helzer v. Helzer,
193 Pa. 214.
The motion for a new trial is therefore
overruled.
HARPER vs. RAILROAD CO.
Injury at crossing-Excessive speed of
train-Negligence-Contributory negligence-Stop, look, listen.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A highway crosses the two tracks of the
defendant at right angles. The tractsrun
straight in both directions for 2000 feet
when they turn on the east side toward
the north, ar.d on the west side toward
the south, so that a train could be seen

on the tracks from the crossing only within 2,000 feet of the crossing. At 3 o'clock
P. M%.on August 11th, Harper was about
to cross these tracks from the south when
he saw a train going westward on the
south track. He waited until its rear was
past the crossing 400 feet, when, having
looked in both directions and seeing no
other train, and having listened and hearing no other train, he ventured over the
tracks. A train on the north track was
however coming eastward, being concealed from view by the other train, and
the noise made by it being obscured by
the other. The train on the north track
was coming at the rate of 40miles an hour;
and it sounded neither bell or whistle. It
is clear, however, that if it had, the sound
would not have been heard. Had the
plaintiff got from his wagon and ran to
the south track and looked westward, he
would have seen the east coming train
and have averted the collision. The
court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant because no negligence on the part of the defendant was
visible, and because the plaintiff had been
negligent.
SHERBINE and YEAGLEY for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff fulfilled all the conditions.
He stopped, looked, listened, and also
waited until the passing train was 400
feet beyond the crossing. He, therefore,
did all that a prudent and careful man
could be expected to do, The question of
the liability should have been submitted
to the jury. Arnold v. R. R. Co., 115 Pa.
135; Lake Shore R. R. v. Frantz, 127 Pa.
297; McNeal v. R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 184.
A traveler is not bound to get out of his
conveyance and go upon the track to look
for trains. Ellis v. Lake Shore R. R. 138
Pa. 506; R. R. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504.
VASTINE and WELSH for the defendant.
When a person, having stopped at a
crossing and waited until a train has
passed, immediately drives upon the track
and is struck by a train which was hidden
by the first train, when, by waiting a few
seconds, the second train would have become visible and the accident averted, his
negligence justifies the withdrawal of the
case from the jury. Hovenden v. P. R.
R., 180 Pa. 244; Hughes v. D. & H. Canal
Co.,176 Pa. 254; Parker v. P. R. R., 182 Pa.
336; Krouss v. R. R., 139 Pa. 272.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

At just what point a party should stop,
look and listen, depends upon thevarying
circumstances of each case, and Is a ques-
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tion for the jury. Lake Shore R. R. Co.
v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297;Arnoldv. R. R. Co.,
115 Pa. 135; McNeal v. R. R. Co., 131 Pa.
184; Ellis v. Lake Shore R. R. Co., 138
Pa. 522. The vital question in this case,
whether the plaintiff waited a sufficient
time after the train on the south track had
passed, is similar to the above question,
and should have been left for the jury to
decide.
If, in the evidence, there is any doubt of
the plaintiff's negligence, the case must
go to the jury. McNeal v. R. R. Co., 131
Pa. 188. The fact that he waited till the
train on the south track was beyond the
crossing 400 feet, couplel with the other
facts, does not show positive proof of negligence on plaintiff's behalf. But rather,
it shows the opposite-carefulness. He
stopped, looked and listened, and, furthermore, waited till the train on the south
track passed 400 feet beyond the crossing,
then looked again. Not hearing or seeing
another train, he attempted to cross. The
element which distinguishes this case from
Hughes v. D. & H. Canal Co., 176 Pa. 254,
is, that in the latter case plaintiff's negligence was so unquestionable that the court
should pronounce upon it as a matter of
law. In that case the passing train was
only by the crossing twenty feet when
plaintiff attempted to cross.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff did wait
until the passing train was by 400 feet,
sufficient to give a view of the opposite
track to that extent, which was then clear.
The cases cited by defendant do not say
how long a man must wait after a train
has passed before he may cross, therefore
it is a question for the jury to say whether
400 feet is a proper distance in connection
with the other facts of the case.
It is not shown that plaintiff was struck
the moment he got upon the track, but it
is clearly stated that the view of the train
was obstructed by the train on the south
track. Hence, Connerson v. D. & H.
Canal Co., 169 Pa. 339; Holden v. R. R.
Co., 169 Pa. 1, and others cited with it, do
not apply. It is clearly shown that the
plaintiff did wait more than a second. He
waited till the train was past 400 feet.
Hence, cases cited by defendant, including
Gangwer v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co.,
168 Pa. 265, do not apply, as the evidence
was not so preponderating as to justify
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taking the question of negligence from the
jury. After considering all the facts in
this case, the court holds that the question
whetner the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or not was a question
of fact for the jury. Hence, the court
erred in taking the case from the jury.
A new trial is granted.

SCHNEE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
In cases of the class to which this belongs there are always two questions: (1).
Has the injury, which forms the gravamen, been caused by the negligence of the
defendant? and (2). Would that cause
have produced the result had there not
been contributory negligence of the plaintiff?
It does not appear what, in the opinion
of the plaintiff, was the negligent act of
the defendant. But three acts or omissions are developed by the evidence, movement at the rate of forty miles per hour,
the omission to ring the bell, the omission
to sound the whistle. It distinctly appears
that the last two did not cause the accident, for it would have occurred even had
the bell and whistle both sounded. There
remains to be considered simply the speed
of forty miles per hour. Did it cause the
accident? If so, was it negligent in the
company to run the train at that rate?
The accident occurred at a public crossing, and prudence dictates that a slower
rate of speed be maintained at such a
crossing, because of the increased probability that passengers, teams and vehicles
will be on the track when the proximity
of a coming train becomes manifest to the
driver, or the presence of the vehicle is discovered by the engineer. The train should
be moving at such a rate as to make its
stoppage possible before running into a
crossing vehicle, or as to give the vehicle
a chance to complete the crossing, in case
it has begun before the presence of the
train can be realized. In a proper case, it
should be left to the jury to say whether
the rate of forty miles per hour was, at the
place, excessive.
But, an excessive rate, though the company be negligent in maintaining it, is not
a ground of recovery, unless it has caused,
alone, orin conjunction with other circumstances, the accident. We have looked
into the evidence in vain to discover that
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from it the jury would have been justified
in declaring that, had the rate of speed
been less, had it been, e. g., fifteen miles,
or ten miles, per hour, the accident would
have been averted. The rear of the departing train was but 400 feet past the
crossing when Harper began to cross.
Four hundred feet are one-thirteenth of a
mile. At ten miles per hour the train
would have covered this distance in
slightly less than one-half minute. A
portion of this time was occupied in moving from the south side of the railroad way
across the south track. Nothing in the
evidence would justify the jury in saying
that the train should have been moving
more slowly than ten miles per hour, or
that, moving at that rate, the collision
would have been avoided. It was incumbent on the plaintiff not merely to prove
that the actual speed was too great, but
that, had the proper speed been observed,
the damage to the plaintiff would not have
occurred.
Moreover, in order to condemn the trial
court for granting a non-suit, it would be
necessary to find that there was no such
evidence of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence as justified the court in pronouncing its existence, and dispensed with
the submission of the question to the jury.
When Harper undertook to cross the
tracks from the south, he saw the train on
the south track moving westward. He
knew that there might be an east-bound
train on the north track ; that, if there
was, he could not see nor hear it for a moment or two; but that, in that time, he
would be able to see for 2,000 feet, and
probably to hear the approaching train
even a greater distance. If it clearly appeared that the collision would have been
avoided had Harper waited longer, it
would, we think, have been the duty of
the court to non-suit the plaintiff. Although the dccisions are not harmonious,
there is no better reason for requiring a
plaintiff to stop, look and listen than for
requiring him to wait a proper time for the
disappearance of a swiftly-moving obstruction to sight and hearing, Hovenden v.
Penna. R. R. Co., 180 Pa. 244; Kraus v.
Penna. R. R. Co., 139 Pa., 272; Hughes v.
Del. & H. Canal Co., 176 Pa. 254. Cf.
Davidson v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R., 179

Pa. 227; Philpott v. Penna. R. R. Co., 175
Pa. 570.
It does not clearly appear, however,
that the negligence of the plaintiff caused
the accident, i. e., that, had he waited until the departing train had gone further,
the accident would have been avoided.
He could have seen only 2,000 feet, less
than two-fifths of one mile. The train
was coming at the rate of forty miles per
hour. It covered the 2,000 feet, therefore,
in thirty-six seconds. Harper would have
heard no whistle nor bell, and the noise of
the west-bound train would have mingled
with that of the east-bound. The defendant has not made it plain that, with proper
care, the plaintiff would have escaped. It
was wrong, therefore, to non-suit him on
the ground of contributory negligence.
The court below awarded a new trial,
and, on the same evidence, submitted the
evidence to the jury, who have found in
favor of the plaintiff. This they should
not have been allowed to do. The eVidence, that the defendant's negligence
caused the accident, in the sense that, but
for it, the accident would not have occurred, was too weak to submit to the jury.
Judgment reversed.
TRAPPER vs. SCOBY.
Contractfor services-Guarantor'sbond
for faith-fulperformance-Knowledgeby
employer of rumor of former embezzlement by employee- When under duty to
speak.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Trapper was applied to by Win. Slocum
to take Slocum into his employ as a bookkeeper, and Scoby offered to become guarantor for him if Trapper would appoint
him. Trapper had learned that Slocum
had been accused by a former employer of
embezzlement, but did not speak of it to
Scoby, who had not heard of it. Trapper
at length, at Scoby's earnest solicitation,
appointed Slocum, receiving a bond of
$10,000 from Scoby, conditioned for the
faithful performance of Slocum's duties.
Slocum embezzled $1,100, and this action
was brought on the bond.
MooN and MINNIoH for the plaintiff.
The mere rumor of an embezzlement did
not create a duty to speak. Neillv. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263; Rockafellow v. Baker,
41 Pa. 319.

THE
LOGAN and STERRETT for the defendant.
There was a duty on the part of the
holder of the bond to disclose his suspicions. Lauer Brewing Co. v. Riley, 195
Pa. 449; Wayne v. Bank, 52 Pa. 343.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The case turns on the question of the
non-communication of the facts known by
the holder of the surety, and material to
be brought to his knowledge before binding himself.
Ordinarily, no penalty attaches to the
non-communication of facts, but when
facts exist which are material to a contract, and not equally within the knowledge of both parties, then there arises a
duty to speak. When such a duty exists,
the concealment of material facts avoids
the contract. In the present case Trapper
had learned that Slocum had been accused
by a former employer of embezzlement,
but did not speak of it to Scoby, who had
not heard of it. This, we think, was a
concealment of a material fact, and released the surety from liability upon the
bond. True it is that Slocum, to the
knowledge of Trapper, had not been convicted of embezzlement, yet Trapper knew
he had been accused of embezzlement.
Had this fact been communicated to Scoby,
he, no doubt, would never have become
surety.
In Lauer Brewing Co. v. Riley, 195 Pa.
449, when the sureties signed the bond in
suit, the principal was a defaulter to the
plaintiff, ind this fact was concealed from
the sureties. The holding of the court was
that the concealment avoided the bond as
to them. Likewise, in Wayne v. Commercial National Bank, 52 Pa. 343, suit had
been brought upon a bond conditioned on
the faithful performance of the bank
teller's duties. The teller defaulted, as he
had done before the bond was given. It
was held that had the bank ever had any
reason to suspect the dishonesty of the
teller, the non-disclosure of the fact would
have avoided the bond, as wethink it does
in the case at bar.
Judgment for defendant.
MACCONNELL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Had Slocum
he applied to
knowledge of
ant to Scoby.

actually embezzled, when
Trapper for employment,
that fact would, be imporBut, if the rumor that he
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had embezzled was untrue, it cannot be
conceded that Scoby should have had a
chance to be influenced by it, and that
Trapper failed in his duty in not giving
him this chance. It nowhere appears that
Slocum had in fact embezzled. No duty
therefore was on Trapper to tell Scoby,
either that he had, or that it was rumored
that he had. In Lauer Brewing Co. v.
Riley, 195 Pa. 449, -there had been an
actual default, known to, and so far as
appears, only to the company.
Even if it was true that Slocum had
embezzled, we cannot allow that Trapper
was bound to tell Scoby what he knew.
What did he know? That Slocum had
done the wrongful act? No. That the
former employer, or any one who could
know the fact, had accused him of doing
the act? No. Trapper had simply learned,
we are told, that Slocum had been accused
by his former employer. Was Trapper
bound to tell Scoby, that he had heard
that the employer had accused Slocum?
We think not.
Although, had the facts required Trapper
to suspect that Scoby was ignorant of the
character of Slocum, and of his reputation,
it would have been Trapper's duty to repeat to Scoby what he had heard, it could
not be his duty to do so, if he was warranted in believing, and believed that Scoby
was-acquainted with Slocum and with his
reputation. Letusremember that Trapper
did not ask Scoby to become surety. He
apparently had no desire to employ
Slocum. Scoby offered to become guarantor, in order to induce Trapper to appoint
him, and Trapper "at length, at Scoby's
earnest solicitation," appointed him. It
did not seem to Trapper that Scoby was
in need of information from him in regard
to the character of Slocum. There is no
intimation that the rumor was in the consciousness of Trapper, and that he studiously refrained from speaking of it. We
are not able to see that Trapper was,
under the circumstances, under a duty to
recall and mention the rumor concerning
Slocum.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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BECKFORD vs. LEE.

Negotiable instruments-Failureof consideration-Bonafideholderfor value.
MYERS and BOUTON for the plaintiff.

Paper transferred when overdue is taken
subject to all the equities existing between
the original parties. 8 S. & R. 351; 5 W.
& S. 164; 75 Pa. 128; 6 Pa. 164.
HICKERNELL for the defendant.
A bonafide holder, for value and without notice, of a negotiable note, takes it
free from all the equities existing between
the original parties. Bullock v. Wilcox,
7 Watts 328; Bank v. Myer, 6 S. & R. 537.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Henry Lee made a note payable to the
order of Herman Stokes. It reads as follows: "In three (3) months I promise to
pay to the order of Herman Stokes $300,
value received, on account of an automobile this day delivered to me, but the
title to which is not to pass to me unless
and until this note is paid."
Further, it appears that Stokes endorsed
the note eight days after receiving it to
Harry Holcomb, who endorsed it, after
maturity, to John Beckford.
At the trial Lee offered to prove, by producing evidence, that the automobile was
not workable, and that it was agreed by
Stokes that if, on trial, it should not be
found satisfactory, it might be returned
and the note would be cancelled; and that
he had offered it back, demanding the
note, but Stokes refused to receive the
automobile, and told him that he had already negotiated the note.
The court refused to receive this evidence, and rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff, whereupon this motion for a new
trial was made.
It is a well settled fact in Pennsylvania
that a "transferee" of an overdue paper
holds it subject to all equities and to all defences-that do and did exist between the
original parties; hence, since Beckford is
the last transferee of the note (consequently
the last holder), we must treat him as
though he were the original holder,
namely, Stokes; although he would not be
liable for any more than the note itself.
In the first place, this note was made as
a promise of payment upon a conditional
sale, the condition being: "That if the
automobile was not satisfactory on trial it
might bereturned and the note cancelled."

Now whether or not the court was justified In rejecting evidence, as to the dissatisfaction with the automobile, we
think it was proper, for the mere reason
that the note was one for three months,
and not until after the maturity of same
did Lee complain about the machine.
Even though that agreement did exist,
we think in this case, as many other cases
have held upon circumstances of the same
nature, that the vendor did not intend
that the trial of the machine should last
until the note was paid. In such a case,
three months would be considered an unreasonable time to hold the machine for
trial.
Hence, under the circumstances, even
.though the title was not to pass until the
note was paid and that this agreement did
exist between Henry Lee and Herman
Stokes, we think, after a period of three
months had elapsed, Lee having had the
use of the machine meanwhile, it would
be unreasonable to ask for a cancellation of
the note and a return of the machine.
Further, neither Lee nor Beckford could
be put in statu quo, as the former had negotiated the note and the latter was a
bonafide holder for value (his consideration for same having already passed to
Holcomb.)
The motion for new trial is dismissed.
KEELOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The note on which suit is brought, was
endorsed by the payee to Holcomb, eight
days after its date, and therefore before its
maturity. Holcomb endorsed it to the
plaintiff after its maturity. If the note is
negotiable, Holcomb received it free from
any defences founded on a failure, total or
partial, of consideration. His immunity
from exposedness to such a defence, passed
to Beckford, despite the fact that, when
the endorsement to Beckford took place
the note was already past due. Norton,
Bills & Notes, p. 210. In holding otherwise, the learned court below committed
a serious error. 1 Daniels, Negot. Inst. 806.
Is then, the note negotiable?
The note names the transaction out of
which it grew, viz., a sale of an automobile. All notes arise out of sales, loans, or
other transactions. The fact that it specifies the transaction out of which it springs,
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cannot impair the negotiable quality of
the note.
The note also contains the averment
that the ownership of the automobile is
not to pass to the maker until the note is
paid. This does not qualify the obligation
of payment. The maker is unconditionally bound to pay at maturity. The note
simply expresses a portion of the contract,
viz., that stipulation which prevents the
transfer of title until payment. The possession of the automobile had been given
to Lee, he was bound beyond contingency,
to pay the note, so far as its face indicates.
The stipulation in it does not affect his
duty to pay, but his right to the automobile. The relevancy of Gazley v. Reigel,
16 Super. 501, is not apparent, and if it
were, we should hesitate to apply its principle to the case before us.
The offer of evidence was to show that it
had been agreed that if the machine did
not work satisfactorily, it might be returned, and that, thereupon, the note
should be cancelled, that the machine in
fact was not workable, and had been offered back to Stokes, who had declined to
receive it, and that Stokes had refused to
accept the machine, saying that he had
already negotiated the note.
The agreement that the machine might
be returned, and that, if it should be, the
note should be cancelled, was not written
on the face of the note. It does not therefore Impair the negotiability of the note.
There is always an express or implied
agreement that if the consideration fails,
the promise is to be totally or partially
void, but, when this contingency is not
expressed by the note, it remains negotiable.
The note being negotiable, Beckford or
Stokes being a bona fide purchaser, for
value, the fact offered to be proved could
have wrought no consequence. Hence the
proof of it was irrelevant. For this reason,
the exclusion of the proof was proper. We
do not see that, had the note been still in
the hands of Stokes, Leecould not have defended on the ground of his offer to xeturn
the automobile. It does not appear when
this offer was made. It was made more
than eight days after the delivery of the
note, but how much more does not appear.
We cannot say that an offer to rescind,
nine or ten or twelve days after the de-

livery of the note would have been too
late. There is no warrant for the assumption of the learned court below, that the
offer to rescind had not been made for
three months.
For a different reason from that assigned
by the trial court, we are constrained to
the opinion that the exclusion of the evidence was proper.
Judgment affirmed.
ALLEMAN vs. CUSHMAN.
Gratuiltouspromise-Consideration-Powers of marriedwomen-Suretyship-Act
of Tune 8, 1893.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Alleman sold to John Cushman a horse
for $250.00. Cushman paid $150.00 in cash,
and asked his wife Charlotte for the rest.
She having a deposit in bank, gave her
check for $100.00 payable to him, which
he endorsed to Alleman. Payment was
stopped by Mrs. Cushman, and this assumpsit was then brought. The defence
was that the check was without consideration and that in making it Mrs. Cushman was a surety.
PHILLIPS and HAMBLEN for the plain-

tiff.
The check was in payment ofa debt and
should not be construed as to make the
wife a surety. Harrar v. Criney, 32 W.
N. C. 90.
Plaintiff was a bonafide purchaser for
value and should be allowed to recover.
194 Pa. 141.
GRoss and HINDMAN for the defendant.
At most, the consideration for the
check would only have created a suretyship. 38 Pa. 302.
A married woman cannot become a
surety for another. Act of June 8, 1893.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The principal point of law involved in
this case, is whether or not Mrs. Cushman
became a surety. And to determine this
it is necessary to consider what her intention was when she gave her husband the
check. She knew that he had bought the
horse and lacked this amount of $100, and
under those circumstances gave him her
check for that amount. From the facts,
there was no contract between Mr. and
Mrs. Cushman. She simply made him a
gift of $100. A surety is one who endorses
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to become responsible for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another. The definition
as given by the Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law
is technically "and who becomes liable,
only when the principal is unable to perform." There are no such conditions in
this case. Mrs. Cushman did not agree
that if her husband did not pay the $100,
at the end of a definitetime agreed upon,
that she would herself pay it. The only
ground of the defence is that she became
a surety by virtue of having given the
check to her husband which is clearly a
contradiction of her intentions when she
gave the check. Not only is it unreasonable to believe that Mrs. Cushman intended to become her husband's surety
when she gave him the check, but if
she had intended to become his surety,
owing to the transferable character of
a check, which is a specie of money,
being the most common form of payment
in use at the present time, after it reached
the hands of Alleman it could only be regarded as payment. "See Wood on Bills
and Notes."
In 194 Pa. 141, the wife was a surety,
although it did not seem so on the face,
from the fact that she had endorsed the
note first, yet it was her husband's debt
that she had guaranteed to pay. Neither
was the plaintiff an innocent holder,
knowing that the wife was a surety.
That the check was given without a
consideration is irrelevant to the case,
since the check was a mere gift and the
very idea of a consideration destroys the
possibility of a gift. It is impossible to
have a gift where there is a consideration
supporting it.
Seeing no way by which Mrs. Cushman
can be construed as a surety, we feel that
plaintiff is entitled to recover. We therefore give judgment for $100 to plaintiff.
WRIGHT, J.
OPIN [ON OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Mrs. Cushman intended, we must presume, to give $100 to Alleman, in satisfaction of her husband's debt to him. That
she could give a chattel or money, to the
husband, or to a stranger, is unquestionable. She had this power to give to her
husband at common law. The legislation
of 1893 enlarges, not diminishes, the existing competence of a married woman.

Had Mrs. Cushman's intention to give
the hundred dollars to her husband, or,
for him, to Alleman, been executed, she
could by no later act, have annulled it.
The money would irrevocably have become Alleman's. Before, however, the
money was actually paid upon the check,
Mrs. Cushman notified the bank not to
honor it. This she had the power and
right to do, as far as the bank was concerned. The check cannot be considered
an assignment of the $100, and for that
reason, irrevocable. Lloyd v. McCaffrey,
46 Pa. 410; First Nat. Bank v. Gish, 72
Pa. 13 ; Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545;
Contra, 2 Daniels. Negot. Inst. 670.
When Mrs. Cushman revoked the
bank's authority to pay $100 to Alleman,
as she did by her oral notice to it, she gave
a right of action against herself to Alleman, in the absence of special considerations. The disappointed holder of a
check has a right to sue the drawer upon
it. Whatthen are the defences of Mrs.
Cushman? The first alleges that the check
was without consideration. It is plain
that she obtained no legal advantage on
account of it. Did Alleman suffer any
legal disadvantage in reliance on it? It
does not appear that the sttle of the horse
was consummated by the delivery of it, in
consequence of the check. So far as appears, the sale may have been completed,
the horse may have been delivered, before
application was made to Mrs. Cushman
for the check. If that was so, there would
evidently be neither consideration moving
to Mrs. Cushman, nor consideration moving from Alleman. No action would lie
on the implied promise of Mrs. Cushman
to pay the check ; or rather, no promise to
pay it would, under the circumstances, be
implied.
Another defence set forward is, that the
contract, were there a consideration for it,
is beyond the competence of a married
woman. The learned court below contends that the check was a gift ; and that
a married woman can make a gift. The
action however, is not on a gift. It is on
a promise implied for the drawer when a
check is dishonored. The attempt is to execute that promise, or to obtain damages
for its non-performance. When the check
was drawn, it was presumably, the
drawer's intention to give the $100 to her
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husband. The gift was not consummated
until it was paid. Before payment, her
mind changed, and the check was revoked.
On the incomplete gift, it is evident that
no action can be maintained. A promise
to give, being gratuitous, is unenforceable.
At present a married woman may make,
generally speaking, all contracts except
those of accommodation endorser, maker,
guarantor or surety. By giving the check,
she was agreeing that either the bank
should take $100 of her deposit and pay it
to Alleman, or she would pay that amount
to him. It is on this latter promise that
the action is brought. But this promise
was collateral to the obligation of the husband to Alleman. The husband had
bought the horse, and paid $150 only of
the price. He remained liable for the
residue. Nothing shows that the check
was received asmore than conditional payment. If and when it should be paid, the
husband's debt would be extinct, otherwise not.
It is not necessary to consider whether,
had the agreement been that Cushman
should be under no liability to pay more
than the $150 which he did pay, on his
wife undertaking to pay the rest of the
price, it would have fallen within the
classes to make any of which a married
woman is incapable. We see nothing to
indicate that such was the understanding.
So far as appears, the husband owed $250,
until he paid $150. He remained liable
to pay the other $100, although his wife
undertook to pay it. She assumed a liability collateral to his, in the nature of a
suretyship or guaranty. We think that
there should be no recovery.
Judgment reversed.

109

Holmes, and in descending the stairs, fell
and was seriously hurt. He would not
have fallen had the steps been of usual
width, or had there been a bar along the
stairway, of which a walker could have
taken hold. He sues Wilder, the landlord, in trespass for damages.
HUBLFR and EBBERT for the plaintiff.
The owner of a building is liable for injuries sustained by a stranger in consequeuce of its negligent construction.
Godley v. Haggerty, 20 Pa. 387.
The owner is liable, although he had no
notice to repair. Minter v. Hogg, 192 Pa.
137; Lohr v. Phillipsburg, 156 Pa. 249.
JACOBS, J. W. and SCIANz for the defendant.
The guest was a bare licensee and the
landlord owed him no duty. Reardow v.
Thompson, 149 Mass. 267; Township v.
Phillips, 122 Pa. 601; Hogg v. R. R. Co.,
85 Pa. 293.
The landlord could not have been held
liable in damages had a member of the
lessee's family been injured-the guest
could have stood on no higher plane.
Moon v. Iron & Steel Co., 7 Atl. Rep. (Pa.)
198.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is true that one who erects a building
for rent is bound to use reasonable skill
and diligence in its erection; regard being
had to the uses and purposes for which it
is designed. Godley v. Haggerty, 20 Pa.
387. Neither can an owner of property
escape liability for existing defects thereon, by demising it to a tenant and putting
him into possession. Wunderv. McLean,
134 Pa. 334. Fow v. Roberts, 108 Pa. 489.
If there is a duty owed, the lessor cannot
rid himself of that duty by demising the
premises and putting another in possession. Thus it was held in Mintzer v.
Hogg, 192 Pa. 137, that lessor is liable for
injuries caused by a defective walk along
his property even though he had no notice
to repair. It is evident, then, that there
CHISHOLM vs. WILDER.
are duties from which the lessor cannot reLandlord and tenant-Trespasser-Licen- lieve himself.
see-Liability of landlord for injuries
In the case at bar, the plaintiff claims
due to defects in the premises.
that the defendant, the lessor, owed him
a duty, and asks that the question as to
STATEM E NT OF THE CASE.
whether he fulfilled that duty be submitWilder leased to Holmes the second ted to the jury. If damages are allowed
story of a house. The approach to the in this case, that will be a question for the
house was by a flight of stairs on the out- jury, under proper instruction. There
side of the house, boarded in on the outer are no facts disputed. If steps had been
side. The steps were very narrow, not the usual width, or had there been a bar
more than six inches. Chisholm, a rheu- alongside the stairway, the accident would
matic person, paid a friendly visit to not have happened. We believe then,
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that the question for our consideration is,
was or was there not, a duty owed by the
lessor, Theodore Wilder, to the plaintiff,
Win. Chesholm.
Holmes, the lessee, believing the property suitable for his purposes rented the
same. The tenant took and the landlord
transferred the premises as they were.
"A landlord is not liable to lessee for defects, known to lessee, at time of letting.
Caveat emptor applies to such contracts
with full force." Wein v. Simpson, 2
Phila. 158. This stairway did not give
way, but remained the same. It is true
that it was narrow and that no railing
was placed along it. We fail to see how
these facts alone could render lessorliable.
Suppose that the injured had been the
lessee, or a member of his family. Could
a recovery be had after his accepting and
using the steps? We think not. Then in
order that this plaintiff may recover
damages, he must show that. there was a
higher duty owing to him than there was
to lessee or any member of lessee's family.
The presence of the plaintiff on the
premises, we believe, must come under
one of three classifications, to wit, either
as a trespasser, a member oflessee's family,
or as a bare licensee. If a trespasser, no
duty from landlord was owed him. If a
member of the lessee's family, his rights
not being higher than those of the family,
no recovery can be had. If a bare licensee, the landlord owed him no duty save
that of abstaining from wrongful, willful
and culpable negligence, and we are of the
opinion that he fully performed this duty.
The plaintiff was a visitor, had paid a
friendly call to the tenant. Since he was
not ejected by tenant, we presume that
plaintiff was there by license of the
tenant, and as his guest. Hence, he was
lawfully upon the property, but upon it
under the same conditions, as to lessor's
liability, as the lessee. "If dangers are
patent and visible, the visitor, who comes
to and is received within the home, must
share the dangers in common with other
members of the family." More v. Logan
Iron & Steel Co., 7 Atlantic Reporter 198.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
duty which plaintiff claimed to have been
owed to him by defendant, had no legal
existence and a ju'dgment of non suit is
accordingly entered.
SHERBIN'E, 3.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Wilder leased the second story of the
house in question to Holmes. It was approached by a stairway. The only objection to the stalway is that the steps of it
were narrow, and that it was not furnished with a handrail. The stairs were,
in fact, precisely what they seemed to be.
No concealed rottenness or weakness is
averred. We must presume that Holmes
inspected the premises, and so became
aware of their characteristics. If he did
not like a stairway of such narrow steps
he might have declined to become lessee.
Wien v. Simpson, 2 Phila. 158. Doubtless
the house was not the most commodious
possible, but the rent corresponded. It
would be absurd to hold that a landlord
should be obliged to furnish to his tenant
a better house than the latter bargained
for, on pain of having to indemnify the
tenant for any inconveniences resulting
from his use of it.
The plaintiff was the guest of Holmes,
and, being a rheumatic, fell while descendingthestairs. He wasnotatenant. Did
Wilder owe to him any larger duty than
he owed to Holmes? Clearly not. The
burden would be enormous, if a landlord
were responsible to every child or infirm
person who visiting his tenant, should be
injured on the premises, because they
were not in a state, other than the actual.
The cheaper tenements must be wanting in many things to be found in those
commanding larger rentals. Those who
rent them, or who visit their tenants,
must not expect to find them as commodious or safe as dearer houses. Wilder's
duty was no greater towards Chesholm
than it was towards Holmes. Coupe v.
Platt, 172 Mass. 458, Roche v. Sawyer,
176 Mass. 71.
This case is not to be determined by the
principle that, the premises being in good
repair when they are leased, the landlord
is not liable to third persons for injuries
arising from the subsequent disrepair of
the premises which the tenant ought to
have cured. Cf. Wilder v. McLean, 134
Pa. 334, for there was no change in the
state of the stairway after the making of
lease; nor yet by the principle that for
an accident to a pedestrian on the street,
arising from the state of the pavement,
etc., the landlord is liable whether that
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state has arisen since the making of the
lease or before. Reading City v. Reiner,
167 Pa. 41 ; Brookville Borough v. Arthurs,
152 Pa. 334 ; Mintzer v. Hogg, 192 Pa. 137.
The landlord is liable neither to a tenant
nor to a guest of the tenant, because the
manifest qualities of the premises are not
different from what they are.
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF THE COURT

In this case it is contended by the defendant that he was a bonafide purchaser
for value and without notice of the invalid
acknowledgment of the deed by the plaintiff, and therefore acquired a good title as
against the plaintiff. This appears to be
sound law in reference to a conveyance to
a person either from the original owner or
from an intermediate purchaser.
But if we examine the facts closely we
HARPER vs. COOVER.
find that the defendant did not purchase
the property from the plaintiff or from an
Ejectment-Jointexecution of mortgageCoercion by husband-Falsecertification intermediate purchaser, but at a sheriff's
by notary-Judicialsale--Innocentpur- sale.
The law is well settled as to this point,
chaser.
that the purchaser at a sheriff's sale acSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
quires only the title which is possessed
Sarah Harper made a deed for her hus- by the sheriff, under the rule of Caveat
band, her husband joining, to William emptor.
Rex. Rex conveyed it to John Clarke
Wells v. Vandyke, 106 Pa. 111; Foulke
who gave a mortgage for $1,000, part of v. Millard, 108 Pa. 230. The case then
the purchase money. Clarke afterwards simply resolves itself into one question:
gave a second mortgage for $1,000 to did Clarke have a valid title to the propCoover. In this ejectment plaintiff proves erty? When Clarke purchased the propthat she was coerced by her husband to erty from Rex he knew of the conditions
make the conveyance; that the notary under which the deed was acknowledged
who certified to her acknowledgment was by the plaintiff, and knowing that the
told by her that she executed the convey- acknowledgment was void he therefore
ance under compulsion, and falsely certi- acquired no valid title. Since he acfied that she did it freely; that Rex knew quired no good title he could give no valid
of the duress as did Clarke. No evidence title by a sheriff's sale. Louden v. Blythe,
that Coover knew of the duress. At a 27 Pa. 22 ; Heeter v. Glasgow, 79 Pa. 79.
sheriff's sale on first mortgage Coover be- We therefore think that this action can be
came the purchaser, paying $1,300 for the properly maintained, and render judgland from which the Rex mortgage was ment for the plaintiff. RHODES, F., J.
paid.
TURNER and BORYER for the plain-

tiff.
Where fraud or duress has been practiced in obtaining a wife's acknowledgment, and knowledge of such circumstances can be brought home to the grantee, it will avoid the acknowledgment.
McCandless v. Engle, 51 Pa. 309; Louden
v. Blythe, 27 Pa. 22.
If the grantor obtains his property by
means of duress, his grantee is not protected. The one upon whom the coercion
was brought to bear may regain the property.-51 Pa. 289; 78 Pa. 15; 108 Pa. 230.
BRooxs and OSBORNE for the defendant.
A deed obtained through fraud or duress is only voidable and bona fide purchasers from the grantee in such deed
without notice, and for a valuable consideration, will be protected. Darlington v.
Darlington, 5 W. N. C. 529; Weeks v.
Hoas, 3 W. & S. 520 ; Singer Manfg. Co. v.
Rook, 84 Pa. 442.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Although upon the deed from Mrs.
Harper to Rex is the certificate of acknowledgement by the notary she offers
to show that she in fact did not acknowledge it; but on the contrary, that she declared to the notary that she did not freely
and without coercion, execute it. She offered also to show that Rex was aware of
these facts. As against Rex, these facts
could be shown, and on the showing of
them, the deed to him, would, so far as he
is concerned, become null. The certificate
does not protect one who accepts the conveyance with knowledge of its falsity.
But the deed might be void, so far as
Rex is concerned, without being void as
respects one deriving the land from him,
in ignorance of the impeaching facts.
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Elder v. Hamilton, 195 Pa. 559. Rex conveyed the land to Clark, who gave a
mortgage to him for a portion of the purchase money. Mrs. Harper offered to
show that Clark at the time knew of the
duress practiced upon her. If he did, she
could avoid her conveyance as against
him. Rex, having the knowledge, would
not improve his position with regard to
the land by granting it away, and changing his interest into a mortgage.
After Clark's mortgage to Rex, he made
a second mortgage to Coover. No offer
was made to show that Coover knew of
facts which invalidated the conveyance
to Rex. When he examined the deed, he
saw the notary's certificate upon it. He
was not bound to suspect its accuracy and
inquire elsewhere whether it was true.
His mortgage then, must be deemed valid,
as against Mrs. Harper. Now, a mortgagee has a right to the possession, until the
mortgage debt is paid. It follows that
Mrs. Harper cannot eject Coover, until
she pays back to him the money for which
the mortgage was given.
But there has been a sheriff's sale of the
premises upon the first mortgage. When
a sale takes place on an earlier lien, it divests not only the lien on which it took
place, but also the later liens. Normally,
therefore, the Coover mortgage would
have been divested, and therefore no right
to the possession of the premises would
continue in Coover, as mortgagee. Mrs.
Harper, however, is alleging the invalidity
of the mortgage on which the sheriff's
sale took place. Her action presupposes
this. If it was valid, of course a good
title has passed, by his purchase at the
sheriff's sale to Coover.
But it was not valid, as against Mrs.
Harper. The sale upon it cannot therefore be allowed to divest the Coover
mortgage. When the plaintiff repays to
him the $1000 which he lent to Clark, she
will be entitled to the possession, but not
before. Had Coover not had knowledge
of the duress practiced on her, when h6
bought'at the sheriff's sale, he would have
acquired an indefeasible title. He was
made aware of it before his purchase, and
therefore was put into the position of Rex,
the first mortgagee. The money that he
paid to Rex has been lost; but he is not
prevented from claiming as if the judicial

sale had not taken place, as against the
plaintiff who herself asserts the invalidity
of the mortgage on which it proceeded. It
follows that the judgment must be reversed. Elder v. Hamilton, 195 Pa. 559.
The learned court below, falling back
upon the principle of caveat emptor, as
applicable to purchasers at judicial sales,
concluded that, as Clark, as mortgagor,
and Rex, as mortgagee, had no valid title,
as against Mrs. Harper, Coover acquired
none by his purchase. In so doing, it overlooked the principle that a purchaser at
sheriff's sale is protected by the recording
acts. 4 P. & L. Dig. 6879, and by the
principle that many defects not manifest
on the face of the deed, such as duress,
fraud, cannot be set up against a bona
.fide purchaser for value, though he purchase at a judicial sale.
Judgment reversed.
HAZLETT vs. TOOMEY.
Vills-Life estate-Power of sale, re-investment and use of income-Contractto
sell- Interference by reversionerefusal to accept deed -Payment of purchase money decreed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Anna Hazlett, left a will, in which she
said: "I give my dwelling house and
grounds, to my husband, for his life. If
he chooses he may sell it and invest the
proceeds in mortgages, receiving and using
interest thereon, but not the principal,
which I give to my daughter Alice."
Joseph Hazlett contracted to sell the
house to Toomey, in fee, for $4000. Alice,
hearing of the contract, and averring that
the house was worth $6000, notified
Toomey that she would contest its validity.
Toomey thereupon declined to accept
the deed and pay the purchase money.
Assumpsit for purchase money.
COOK and CRARY for the plaintiff.

Property may be devised for life, with
power to sell the same in fee. Forsythe v.
Forsythe, 108 Pa. 129 ; Hinkley's Appeal,
116 Pa. 490; Hinkley v. Rehm, 16 Sup.
470.
The title is marketable unless it raises a
considerable and rational doubt. Mere
opinions will not justify a party in refusing to comply with his contract. Dalzell
v. Crawford, Parsons Eq. cases, Vol. 1 p.
45.
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the proceeds of the sale, and, therefore, it
would be against his pecuniary interest to
sell for less than its true value. From the
facts of the case there is no evidence of
any fraud. The courts have held that a
recovery in an action of assumpsit for purchase money due on a contract for sale of
land will have the effect of a decree for
specific performance, and must be decided
upon some equitable principles.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The counsel for the defendant argued
This action is brought to recover $4,000,
the purchase money on a contract for the that the plaintiff's title was not a marketsale of the house of Anna Hazlett, de- able one, and, therefore, defendant could
not be compelled to accept it. The cases
ceased. The defendant declined to accept
the deed and pay the purchase money be- in which courts have refused their aid to a
cause lie was notified that Alice Hazlett, vendor, where they have considered his
who had a vested remainder, would con- title good, though disputable, are cases of
real and serious difficulty. The doubt to
test the validity of the sale.
The first question for determination in have this effect, must be a "considerable,
this case is whether or not the testatrix, a rational doubt."
The mere fact that the testatrix's
by the clause authorizing sale, conferred
upon her husband the right to sell the en- daughter said that the property was worth
tire estate or simply his life interest there- $6,000 and informed the defendant that
she would contest the title does not justify
in.
The words "for his life" do not limitthe his refusing to comply with his contract.
quantum of the estate which he could con- If this should be so decided by the courts
vey, but the time during which it was to it would certainly open an avenue to fraud,
be conveyed. The intention of the testa- because if a vendee should learn, after inaktrix must govern the interpretation of the ing a contract for purchase of land, that he
will if it can be discovered in the words ,gotthe worst of the bargain, he could refuse
employed. It is clear to the court that to pay the price on the ground that his
Anna Hazlett, the testatrix, intended to counsel, or in fact most any person, had
give her husband a power of absolute dis- informed him that the title was not a
posal in any manner he might think marketable one, and that the validity of
best. Now the question arises, what can it would be contested.
The facts of the case do not say that the
he dispose of? The power of disposal relates to the property in specie, and not to house was worth more than $4,000, and
a mere interest in it, and the clause in the the averment of Alice Hazlett that it is
will cannot be read in any other way with- worth $6,000, is not sufficient evidence to
out doing violence to the manifest inten- cause the court to say it is worth more than
tion of the testatrix. The court is of the the price bargained for. If Alice Hazlett
opinion that the husband has a life estate, had sufficient evidence to show that it
coupled with an unlimited and absolute was worth more than $4,000, she could
power to dispose of a fee. Hinple v. have so shown a court of equity and had
the plaintiff enjoined from selling it for.
Rehm, 16 Sup. 470 ; Forsythe v. Forsythe,
an inadequate price. The court in Dal108 Pa. 129.
The second question for determination zell v. Crawford, 1 Parson's Equity Cases,
in this case is whether or not the defend- 37, held, that the opinion of conveyancers
ant can refuse to pay the purchase money or of counsel against a title will not justify
on ground that Alice Hazlett said that a party in refusing to comply with his
property was worth $6,000, and if defend- contract.
ant would buy it she would contest the vaOn the whole case we are of the opinion
lidity of the sale?
that the defendant has shown no excepThe court is of the opinion that the hus- tion to this title that would justify a court
band has acted in good faith, because it is of equity in refusing a decree for specific
evident that he is to have the interest of performance.
FxEITz for the defendant.

A purchaser will not be compelled to accept a title which is in the least degree
doubtful. Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 436;
Tillotson v. Gesner, 33 N. J. Eq. 313;
Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184.
In an action for the purchase money of
real estate, plaintiff cannot recover if his
title is not a marketable one. Holmes v.
Woods, 168 Pa. 530.
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Therefore judgment is entered for the
plaintiff.
MAYS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Anna Hazlett gave to her husband a
life estate in her dwelling house. She
also authorized him, if he chose, to sell it,
invest the proceeds in mortgages, and
appropriate to himself the income thereon during his life. The principal in case
of sale she gave to her daughter, Alice.
Joseph Hazlett has a general power of
sale. He may select'the purchaser, determine the price, the terms, the time of
sale. The sale is to be made primarily for
his own benefit, but inasmuch as it converts the reversion which Alice takes
under the intestate law into money, she
has a vital interest likewise in it. If
made wisely, she is benefited, if for too
small a price, she is injured.
Some one, however, must have the discretion as to the time, mode, price, etc.,
of a sale, and this discretion is not lodged
by the testatrix in Alice. The power was
unnecessary to effect a sale if Alice's consent was to be necessary, for as reversioner
she could without it have united in her
father's deed and a fee would have been
conveyed. It was the testatrix's intention
that the husband, on his own view of the
propriety of the sale, should have the
decision.
It would not follow from this, however,
that he could sell the land at less than he
could obtain for it. The power is held
under a species of trust. The motive of
the sale may be the procurement of a
larger annual income from the money
obtained for the land invested in the
mortgage, than could be secured from the
land itself, but a sale being resolved upon,
Joseph Hazlett would not have a right to
sell for as little an he chose in the face of
a larger bonafide bid. He owes a duty to
the reversioner, to take the best bid that he
thinks he can command. Should he attempt to sell to X for $4,000 when he knew
that Y would 'pay him $6,000, he would
attempt an act injurious to Alice. At
her instance a court of equity would enjoin against the sale for $4,000. And, if
Alice had been able to produce, and had
produced to her father a bona fide purchaser at $6,000, and had informed Toomey
of the fact, Toomey would have completed
the purchase at his peril. She couldhave

had the sale set aside as to her interest
as reversioner. Such being her power,
Toomey would not be compelled in equity
or at law to pay the $4,000 and accept Hazlett's deed. The title would have been
not only unmarketable but unsound.
These, however, are not the facts proven
by Toomey. He does not show that there
was a bona fide purchaser at $6,000, and
that of this purchaser Joseph Hazlett and
himself had been made aware. He proves
simply that Alice, hearing of his contract,
averred that the house was worth $6,000,
and announced her intention to contest
the validity of the sale. There was, in
short, a difference of opinion between the
father and daughter as to the value of
the house, or as to the wisdom of selling it
at $4,000. He thought $4,000 the best price
he could obtain, she thought he could-get
$6,000, or, both agreeing that the house
was worth $6,000, but a bidder of only
$4,000 haying been secured, he found it to
his advantage to sell it even at that sum,
and she found it to her advantage that it
should not be thus sold.
To allow the difference of estimate of
the value of the house to bar the sale
would be to do what the testatrix has intended to prevent, viz., suspend the sale
on the concurrence of the wills of both
Joseph and Alice. It is equally clear that
the conversion of the house into money
was to be made at the option of the husband, even though the daughter did not
wish it, and with reason believed that it
would be to her detriment. She had no
right to a present possession of the house.
It was his for his life. It might well be
to his advantage to change it into money
even if it would not be advantageous to
her.
It is true that he could have sold his lite
estate, but such a sale would not have
been as beneficial to him, in all likelihood,
as a sale of the fee, with investment of
the purchase money and appropriation of
the annual interest thereon. The testatrix has chosen to give her husband, in
excess of the curtesy allowed him by law,
this power of sale, and it is to be exercised
primarily for his advantage, although it
were better for Alice that it should not be
exercised at all, or that it should be exercised only for a price not capable of being
now obtained.
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It is not alleged that more than S4,000
can be gotten now or in a short time for
the land. To prevent the sale now would
be to prevent it for reasons for which it
could always be prevented. Thus the intention of the testatrix could be overridden.
The sale to Toomey will be valid, and the
deed to him inexpugnable despite the facts
alleged by him. There is, therefore, no
reason for discharging him from, his conJudgment affirmed.
tract.

no actual notice of such outstanding equities. Shields v. Trammel, 19 Ark. 51;
Ferrier v. Buzick, 2 Iowa 136; Russel v.
Moffit, 6 How. 303.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Allison owned three horses, the only
three of that kind known to be in this
country. He contracted to sell them to
the plaintiff for $650 apiece, but afterwards sold them to Trapp, one of the defendants to this action, for $800 apiece,
who paid for them ($2400). Trapp knew
of the former contract to sell the horses, or
HOPE vs. ALLISON.
at least suspected that it had been made,
which was sufficient to put him on his
Bill in equity-Sale of horses of special guard.
breed-Failure to deliver-Sale to anSo we have the case of a man making
other-Inadequateremedy at law-Spe- an executory contract to sell a chattel to
cicicperformance.
one party, and then turning around and
selling it to another, with that other's
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
knowledge of the former transaction, and
Allison, owning three horses of a special an action by the first contracting party to
breed, contracted to sell them to Hope for comnpel specific performance. The first
$650 apiece, there being no more of that
and principal ground of defence is that
breed to the knowledge of the parties in
the plaintiff has a full and adequate
the United States.
remedy at law. To answer this, it is
Allison, learning that John Trapp was necessary to determine which of the two
willing to give him $800 apiece for them, purchasers acquired superior rights in
sold them to Trapp and delivered them, the horses, the former purchaser, or the
Trapp paying $2,490 in cash. Trapp had latter purchaser. If the latter, then the
heard of Hope's negotiations with Allison only remedy the plaintiff could have,
and suspected that a contract had been would be an action in damages. If the
made but purposely avoided asking Alli- defendant has a superior right to the
son or Hope.
horses, however severe the hardship may
Hope files this bill in equity against
be, it could not justify the taking away of
Allison and Trapp, to restrain Trapp from something from one who has a superior
a further sale of the horses and to compel right to that, and giving it to another
him and Archibald Allison to deliver the who has an inferior right to it.
horses to him for $1,950.
But did Trapp acquire a better title to
BERKHOUSE and HiNImAN for the the horses than Hope? We think not.
He bought and paid for the animals in the
plaintiff.
The rule that courts of equity will not face of, and with knowledge that, another
compel specific performance respecting
contract for the same animals existed. So
things merely personal in their nature is he got no better title than Allison was
limited to cases where a compensation in
damages furnishes a complete and ade- possessed of (which would not have been
quate remedy. P. & L. Dig. Decisions, so if he had been an innocent purchaser.)
Vol. V. 8651.
The general rule in Pennsylvania in reIt has in numerous instances decreed
specific performance when the rarity, the gard to specific performance, on executory
beauty, the interest attaching, or some contracts, is that it cannot be obtained,
other cause, makes it impossible to repre- where the object of the transaction is a
sent the chattel in money. McGowen v. chattel. But where the article has a value
Remington, 12 Pa. 61; Duke of Somerset
v. Cookson, 3 P. Wms. 390; Teels v. Reed, due to its peculiar attraction or rareness,
specific performance may be had.
3 Ves. 70.
This doctrine was held and fully exCISNEY and JAms for the defendant.
pounded
by the learned judge in 193 Pa.
be
deSpecific performance will not
creed against a bonafide grantee who has 207. In this case the Northern Central
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damages for the refusal of Allison to perform the contract. If there were other
horses of the same breed, or even of subtantially the same qualities, which Hope
could command, it would be enough to
give him the difference between the price
he agreed to pay and the price he would
need to pay to obtain substitutes. Damages would be an adequate compensation.
For some reason, he desired horses of this
particular breed. His desire may be a
fancy, but he has contracted for its satisfaction. If the chancellor has not thought
it beneath his dignity specifically to execute a contract for the sale of a fipely
such cases.
carved cherry stone, or of a silver tobacco
If a person could contract to sell an ar- box, or of an ancient horn, or of an antique
ticle to one party, and immediately upon
silver altar-piece, 22 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
a better offer from another person sell it
989; Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434, we see no
once again, business would be greatly
reason for his disdainingto compel the delivery of three blooded horses.
handicapped from the fact that it would
never be certain when an article was
The qualities of these horses mayjustify
bought.
the special estimation in which the plainNeither do we see why it should be
tiff holds them, yet they may not be such
necessary for there to be a right of specific
thatajury would be able proximately to apperformance with both contracting parpraise them in money. But, even if they
ties, since the nature of the two consideracould, the inability to obtain other horses
tions must determine that. On the one side
of the same qualities, would justify the dethe rare value of the horses would justif.v cree for the specific performance of Allispecific performance; while on the other
son's contract.
the simple money consideration could not
There is no philosophical reason for litsupport any action other than for dam- erally enforcing contracts for land, that
ages. But owing to the rare value of the would not apply to contracts for chattels
horses and being unobtainable in the com- that cannot be replaced by substitutes.
mon markets, and in view of a plain conThe difference between the three horses
tract to sell them to Hope, Allison imagreed to be sold, and any other three
mediately sold them to another party,
most similar to them, may be as substanand also, this party having knowledge of
tial as that between the piece of land barthe former contract, we believe no injus- gained for, and another available in the
tice will be done, and that it will be an
market to the purchaser. The court of
equitable solution of the case to order
equity will not hesitate to enforce condefendant to answer the bill by specific
tracts for chattels, when they have attriperformance with costs attaching and we
butes of which no available substitutesare
therefore thus decree.
in possession. McGowin v. Remington,
PHILLIPS, J.
12 Pa. 56. Cf. Goodwin Co.'s Appeal, 117
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Pa. 514.
The decision of the learned court below
The horses have been sold and delivered
is justified by the disclosed facts.
by Allison to Trapp, but Trapp had heard
The contract was for the sale of three of Hope's negotiation for them, suspected
horses at $650 a piece. These horses were a contract with him, purposely avoided
of a "special breed," and the parties knew
asking Allison or Hope concerning it, and
at the time of none other of that breed in
paid $800 apiece for the horses. Though
the United States. It is not shown that
for value, he is not a bona fide purchaser.
they knew of any when the bill was filed,
His purchase was unneighborly and, in a
nor that they know of any now.
sense, fraudulent. He will not be allowed
The remedy at law would be merely for
to oppose an obstacle to the specific execuRailway Company made an executory
contract for some stocks and bonds, with
one Walwarth, who afterwards sold them
to another party. There was a subsequent
sale of the stocks and bonds, in disregard
of a prior contract. Justice Green said:
"The fact that it was not possible for the
plaintiff to obtain these special stocks and
bonds except by specific performance was
sufficient ground for ignoring the general
rule which denies specific performance to
executory contracts in the sale of chattels.
This is also strongly supported by 117 Pa.
514. This doctrine seems to be not only
the law, but the only equitable solution of
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tion of the contract. Equity will require
the purchase money, $650 for each horse,
to be paid by Hope to Trapp, but Trapp,
not more than Allison, can retain the
horses, in contempt of Allison's contract
to sell them.
Appeal dismissed.

Act of February 17, 1876, places assignees' sales upon same footing assheriff's
sales. Luce v. Snively, supra.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
The law is well settled that "parties
may by clear and express words in deeds.
of conveyance create liens upon land
KELLER vs. TWIFORD.
either for purchase money or for the perAssignee's sale-Chargefor maintenance formance of collateral conditions, which
will be binding between themselves and
-Bights of priorjudgment creditorstheir
privies." Flester v. Green, 48 Pa.
Resale ordered divesting all liens.
96. But the question here to be determined is whether or not a party can in a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
deed of conveyance make a charge upon
Keller owning land on which was a
his land which can defeat the rights of
judgment lien of $3,000, sold it for $2,500
those holding judgment liens prior in
to Henry Craig, the deed stating that the
point of time. And further if not, will the
sale was "under and subject to charge for
the support of John Keller during his nat- sale of the property by the vendee's assignee by order of court, divest the lien of the
ural life."
prior judgments and yet keep alive the
Craig contracted debts and finally asvendor's charge?
signed for the benefit of his creditors.
A person by deed can transfer only what
Under an order of the common pleas the
interest he has in the land. When Keller
assignee sold the land for $200 subject to
sold the land there was a judgment lien of
the charge in favor of Keller.
$3,000 against it. His sale of the land to
The result of the sale would be that
Craig could not divest the interest of the
Keller would obtain his subsistence from
judgment creditors and a reservation of
the land in preference to the judgment
creditors, who therefore petitioned the any benefit for himself could not be taken
court to set the sale aside, and require the at theirexpense. The court in Bonebrake
v. Summers, 8 Sup. 73, says, "It is clear
assignee to make another.
HoucK andJAcons, (J. H.) for plaintiff. that Bonebrake could not have made the
reservation in his deed to Smith at the exPrior judgments bind every interest in
land. Dougan v. Blocher, 24 Pa. 28;
pense of his lien creditors. They could
Tower's Appeal, 9 W. &S. 104; Lauman's
have at any time sold his entire estate."
A.ppeal, 8 Pa. 475; Mix v. Ackla, 7 Watts
Furthermore, Keller must have sold the
316; Mills v. Retter, 197 Pa. 353.
Granting resale is entirely in the discre- land subject to the judgment of $3,000.
tion of the court. Ramay v. Hersker, 153
The court in Fisher v. Keen, I Watts 262,
Pa. 480; Carver's Appeal, 89 Pa. 278; Mysays, "If Jacob Ridgeway should proceed
ers Estate, 192 Pa. 408; Germer v. Ento sell the property on which this $1,401.67
sign, 155 Pa. 464.
(the amount of a prior lien) is charged, he
Gross inadequacy of price resulting from
mistake is cause for setting sale aside. Ritmust sell subject to this lien, the purchaser
ter v. Getz, 161 Pa. 648; Myers' Estate,
must take subject to it. * * * * They (the
supra; Glenn v. Mickey, 130 Pa. 599.
owners of the prior lien) have, then, alien
Where proceeds do not satisfy prior
for this sum prior to Mr. Ridgeway's and
judgments equitable liens will be divested
by resale ordered. Bonebrake v. Summers,
better, and which must become effectual,
193 Pa. 22 and 8 Superior 55.
though many years may elapse first."
HuGus and Yocum for defendant.
Therefore the judgment creditors have an
An equitable lien was created by words
interest prior and primary to that of
of deed. Heister v. Green, 48 Pa. 96;
Keller, and in the absence of laches on
Bryan's Appeal, 101 Pa. 892; Washburn's
Estate, 187 Pa. 165; Bonebrake v. Sum- their part the judgment lien would be enforceable against the land in the hands of
mers, supra.
An equitable lien for maintenance sur- any person.
vives the assignees' sale. Luce v. Snively,
The Act of Feb. 17, 1876, in part, has been
4 Watts 396; Ringrose v. Ringrose, 170 Pa.
repealed by the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L.
602 : Boyt'sAppeal, 183 Pa. 99; Bonebrake
V. dummers, supra.
423. The Act of June 4, 1901, is a substi-
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tution for it, P. L. 415.

"A public sale

may be made thereof, freed and clear of
such liens or claim, by leave of court after
notice to the claimants, and the fund realized shall take the place of the liens or
claims and be distributed on the settlement of the account of the assignee or receiver, to the parties found entitled thereto." This act makes it discretionary with
the court whether or not the sale shall be
ordered divested of the liens. In the ease
before us the court exercised its discretion
in ordering Craig's assignee to sell the
property divested of the judgment liens.
yet subject to Keller's charge. Did the
court err in exercising its discretion? "The
reason for ordering a sale which will discharge liens is that a better price may be
obtained by enabling bidders to kiow
what they are buying"
Myers' Estate,
198 Pa. 458. Cases may often arise where
intending purchasers may refuse to buy,
because they are not certain what sort of a
title they are acquiring. In the case before us the purchasers were told that the
land would go to them subject to Keller's
life interest. They also knew that there
were prior judgments against tile land.
The result was that an element of uncertainty crept in and we may conjecture
that that was the cause of the low price
obtained at the sale. For this element of
uncertainty coupled with the low price
obtained the court will order a re-sale.
Ritter v. Getz, 161 Pa. 8.
It is clear that the judgment bound
Craig's interest in the land and his assignee could take no greater interest than
he had. Mills v. Ritter, 197 Pa. 353. The
Act of June 4, 1901, gives the court no
power to order an assignee to sell more
than passed to him by the assignment.
Furthermore, prior liens are always favored by the law. Patterson's Estate, 25
Pa. 71. If the court simply by a judicial
order could compel property to be sold divested of prior liens, such would work a
fraud upon the holders of prior liens. The
holders of such would never know when
they are safe. It cannot be doubted that
the holders of prior liens have equities
greater than the creditors of Craig, or
greater than those of John Keller. If we
allow the sale to stand it amounts simply
to this, that a person by his own acts can
divest the prior liens upon his property

without satisfying them. This principle
the law can never recognize and therefore
the petition to set the sale aside is granted.
And it is ordered and decreed that the assignee of Craig make a re-sale of the property.
COOPER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

The conclusion of the learned court below in disposing of the case is entirely satfactory.
On Keller's land was a judgment lien of
$3,000. Keller's charge in favorof himself
was of course subject to this lien. He
could not embarrass the judgment creditors' right to sell the land and obtain from
it his debt. The fact remains, however,
that the common pleas did order the sale
of the land divested of the judgment, and
that, in consequence of its order that the
sale should be subject to the Keller charge,
but $200 were realized that might be applied to the judgment. The result is that
less than one-fifteenth of the judgment
debt can be paid, while the subsequent
charge in favor of Keller remains in full
force. A consequence so subversive of
the rights of the judgment creditor would
be intolerable and it is not surprising that
the learned court, on his petition, set the
sale aside.
In Bonebrake v. Summers, 8 8uper. 55,
despite the order of the court, by which
the charge was preserved, enough money
was obtained at the sale to pay the earlier
liens. There was therefore no competition
between those liens and the person for
whom the charge was made.
We see no error in the order of the court
setting aside the sale and ordering another,
by which all liens may be divested and
the judgment creditor fully paid, as he
should be, before any provision is made for
Keller.
Appeal dismissed.
PIGIOTT vs. HOLLAND.
Liability of borrower upon a promise to
loanbroker- What constitutes execution
of a contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Holland, desirous of borrowing $10,000,
offered the plaintiff, Pigiott, $50 if he
would find a person who was willing to
lend the amount on bond or mortgage.
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Pigiott secured one Harrip, who was willing to lend the amount, but, when he
learned that Holland's title to the land
he proposed to mortgage rested upon an
alleged adverse possession for twenty-four
years, he refused to respond. Pigiott now
sues upon his contract with Holland to
recover the $50.
LOURimER and CANNON for the plaintiff.
An agent has earned his commission
when he procures a borrower, though the
loan failed through fault of the principal.
S.weeney v. Oil and Gas Co., 131 Pa. 193;
Qr. 130 Pa. 193; 146 Pa. 460.
MATTHEWS and DEVER for the defendant.

No commission is earned by an agent
for procuring a loan where the transaction
fails on account of the insufficiency of the
security. Cochran v. Pierce, 1 Del. 35; 18
Pa. 118; 27 Pa. 462; 146 Pa. 460.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the jury,
This is an action of assumpsit in which
Pigiott is named as plaintiff and Holland
as defendant.
In every contract there must be a direct
agreement between the parties, an acquiescence of the one party to the terms
submitted by the other. When this is
apparent we have a valid and subsisting
contract. You will have to determine
whether or not the terms of this contract
were complied with. If Pigiott secured a
man willing to lend the amount, and that
person, through no fault of the defendant,
was unwilling to place the money, then
Pigiott's responsibility ends.
A conditional offer like this is in truth
not a contract at all, because it binds
neither party before the contract is executed. The party who makes it may withdraw it, and the party to whom it is made
is not bound to accept it. Ifoneman says
to another, "I will give you so much if
you do me such andsuch a service," and
he does it full and completely before retraction, he may demand it by an action,
but to prove the contract he must show
performance of it on his part as an integral part of it. Marvou v. Waltz, 18 Pa.
118.
Another question presents itself: did
the loarf fail through no fault of the plaintiff, but throu'gh defects in the title of the
defendant which were sufficient, in the

usual course of such business, to justify
the proposed lender in declining to go on
with the transaction? Defendant's claim
of title rests upon an alleged adverse possession for twenty-four years. The law
upon this point is very well settled. If
you find that defendant's possession of
the land was open and notorious, hostile
and adverse, and continuous for a period
of twenty-one years or over, then he has
secured a good title against the whole
world. Tiedeman, Real Prop. Aman who
proposes to sell land, or to borrow money
on mortgage upon it, impliedly warrants
that he has a marketable title for the purpose desired, and, in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, his employment of a broker or an agent is sufficient authority for the latter to make representations and negotiations on that
basis.
Middleton v. Thompson, 163 Pa. 112.
Should you find that the contract was
fully performed within the meaning of its
terms, and that defendant's title to the
land was sufficient for the purposes desired, then you should find for the plaintiff, otherwise for defendant.
MILLER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Holland agreed to pay $50 to Pigiott if
he should find a lender of $10,000, on bond
and mortgage at 5 per cent. Did Pigiott
find the lender? What is it to find a
lender ? To find one who actually lends,
or to find one who will lend if the conditions on which lenders ordinarily insist,
are realized ?
If Pigiott was to receive $50 only in case
he should find one who actually lent
$10,000 to Holland, he has not earned the
$50, because no one found by him, has
made the loan. We are then to discover
whether he was to receive the $50 on finding one who would lend, on ordinary conditions. Charles Harrip was found by
Pigiott. He was willing to lend $10,000 on
bond and mortgage, at five per cent., if
Holland's title to the land was satisfactory.
That this is an ordinary condition, there
can be no doubt. It would be folly for a
lender to insist on a mortgage, without insisting that the mortgagor should own the
land, so that the mortgage would be effectual, and that there should be the reasonable evidence of the ownership.
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The title of Holland consisted in an al- to lend on mortgage, in view of the state
leged adverse possession for 24 years. Such of Holland's title. He was willing howa possession would be as good a title as a ever, to take the risk of the title, if the
deed, but the proof of it is not as simple as bond of some solvent person should be
that of a deed. Besides the proof of the procured by Holland. This being imposfact of possession, proof of its uninter. sible, the loan was refused. There was,
rupted continuance for at least 21 years, in all this, nothing showing other than
and of its not being in subordination any that Harrip would have lent, had the conportion of this time to the claim of au- ditions on which lenders usually insist,
other, would be necessary. It does not been furnished. The jury would have
appear what witnesses Holland was able been warranted, therefore, if not required,
to furnish to prove this possession, nor to find that Pigiott had done what he conthat he tendered any to Harrip. Harrip tracted to do, and therefore had earned
was unwilling to take the risk of having the $50.
to prove, and of being able to prove, this
The learned court below in substance
adverse possession, should resort to the directed the jury to find for the defendant
mortgage become necessary. We do not unless they should "find that the conthink that it is so usual for lenders to re- tract was fully performed within the
gard a title by limitation marketable, that meaning of its terms, AND that defendHolland had a right to assume that any ant's title to the land was sufficient for the
lender procured by Pigiott would prove purposes desired." In this, there was
willing to accept a mortgage on land held error. The plaintiff was entitled to reon such a title. Holland should therefore cover, if the defendant's title was insuffihave advised Pigiott of the nature of his cient, and because it was insufficient. Had
title so that Pigiott with full kuowledge it been sufficient, Harrip's refusal to lend
would take the risk of putting forth efforts upon it would have shown that he was
to find a lender, only to have them ren- not the lender for whose "finding" Pigiott
dered futile because of Holland's title. If
was to receive $50. It was because the
Pigiott was to find a lender willing to lend title was insufficient, in the view of ordion a title which lenders are unwilling to nary lenders and loan-brokers, and betrust, this should have been made clear cause this insufficiency had not been made
to him. The fact that Harrip would not known to Pigiott before he expended his
lend on .the mere mortgage, is no proof efforts in finding Harrip, that he is enthat he was not a lender willing to lend
titled to recover. The verdict for the deon the ordinary terms. The terms he in- fendant may be due to the erroneous insisted on were no more severe than the or- struction under consideration. For this
dinary terms.
reason the judgment must be reversed.
Harrip would have done what most
Cf. Wright v. Young, 176 Mass. 100.
lenders do, had he declined peremptorily
Judgment reversed.

